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Abstract—Research on cache-based side-channel attacks
shows the security impact of these attacks on cloud
computing. Therefore, the detection of cache-based side-
channel attacks has received more attention in IaaS cloud
infrastructures because of improvements in the attack tech-
niques. However, such detection requires high resolution
information, and it is also a challenging task because of
the fine-granularity of the attacks. In this paper, we present
an approach to detect cross-VM cache-based side-channel
attacks through using hardware fine-grained information
provided by Intel Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT)
and Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) following the
Gaussian anomaly detection method. The approach shows
a high detection rate with 2% performance overhead on
the computing platform.
Index Terms—side-channel attacks detection, Intel cache
monitoring technology, hardware performance counters,
cloud security, isolation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing makes use of virtualization
technology for dynamic resource allocation,
consolidation and service provisioning. The
virtualization layer schedules allocation of hardware
resources among virtual instances such as virtual
machines (VMs) with different operating systems.
However, this layer has shown several security
issues related to itself and virtualized instances.
Although, the virtualization layer provides isolation,
one new challenge is to guarantee strong isolation
between virtualized instances running on top of the
virtualization layer. OS and hypervisor traditionally
implement resource isolation between processes or VMs
using software/hardware techniques, such as memory
management and access control to key shared physical
resources. However, sharing hardware resources has
an impact on isolation in virtualized environments.
Furthermore, physical resources are often shared
between independent users at very low-level through
the virtualization layer. Such sharing allows bypassing
security mechanisms implemented at virtualization layer,
breaking isolation, and threatening the security of the





(SCA) threaten isolation of virtualized environments.
These attacks use a leaky channel to obtain secret
information such as cryptographic keys. Such channels
are either established through techniques or optimization
mechanisms e.g., memory deduplication used in the
virtualization layer, or micro-architectural vulnerabilities
in processors. The threat of side-channel attacks is
becoming a security concern in cloud computing
[?]. For instance, in IaaS platforms, a CPU cache
which is shared between VMs leaks information on
cache access patterns of running instances (cross-VM
side-channel attacks). The Last-Level Cache (LLC) is
one of resources shared among all cores of processor,
and leaks cache access patterns of a VM running on
another processor core than adversary [2] [3]. To obtain
cache access patterns, an adversary does not need to
any special privileged access. This is why these attacks
gained attention in cloud infrastructures.
Detection of side-channel attacks is hard because of
relying on fine-grained information without exploiting
special security barriers. These attacks may be
detected at OS/hypervisor level through fine-grained
information which are often provided by Hardware
Performance Counters (HPCs): special platform
hardware registers used to store statistics about various
events of the processor (e.g., number of cache misses).
Existing approaches [4] [5] [6] use only HPCs as the
source of raw information in their works to detect
cache-based side-channel attacks. However, other
hardware technologies such as Intel Cache Monitoring
Technology (CMT) providing fine-grained information
on the cache behavior of a virtual machine, might be
useful to improve the precision of detection approaches.
In this work, we present a cross-VM side-channel
attacks detection approach. It leverages Intel CMT
and HPCs to detect side-channel attacks conducted
between two VMs through the LLC. We made the
following contributions: (1) we present a prototype
to detect side-channel attacks using HPCs and Intel
CMT for the first time; (2) we introduce the concept
and implementation of the prototype; (3) we evaluate
the prototype in terms of security and performance
characteristics.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section ??,
we give an overview on existing approaches. Then, in
Section II, we provide some background on the cache ar-
chitecture in processors and on cache-based side-channel
attacks. In Section III, we give an overview on the design
and implementation of the approach. In Section IV,
we evaluate the implemented prototype. Finally, we
conclude with some perspectives in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
Almost all the current detection approaches take ad-
vantage of Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) in
different ways to detect side-channel attacks. The reason
for using HPCs is that they provide information by hard-
ware to detect such fine-grained attacks. As a threshold-
based detection approach; Chiappetta et al. [4] proposed
a detection approach leveraging HPCs to detect the at-
tacks. To analyze statistics collected through HPCs, they
used machine learning and anomaly detection techniques
to detect a side-channel attack between two processes
(i.e., spy and victim). As signature-based detection ap-
proaches; Zhang et al. [5] presented a real-time detection
framework called CloudRadar to detect side-channel
attacks between two VMs in the cloud. Their detection
approach is based on the correlation between running
a cryptographic application in the victim VM and then
monitoring the malicious VM. They generate a signature





by calculating the Fisher Score [7] of different events
provided by HPCs. The signature is then used by the
detector to identify when the sensitive application is
running. Once the application is identified, the detector
starts to analyze performance events (e.g., LLC-misses)
of the adversary VM to detect any malicious behav-
ior through anomaly detection. Payer et al. [6] also
proposed HexPADS to detect inter-process cache-based
side-channel attacks. HexPADS generates signatures for
cache-based side-channel attacks, using HPCs. It then
analyzes running processes in the system to detect which
processes have the same signature as the generated sig-
natures.
III. BACKGROUND
A. Cache Architecture in Modern Processors
Caches of CPUs are specialized memory layers lo-
cated between the CPU and the main memory. They are
used to significantly improve the execution efficiency by
reducing the speed mismatch between the CPU (operates
in GHz clock cycles) and RAM (requires hundreds of
clock cycles to be accessed). In modern processors, we
can typically distinguish different levels of cache: L1, L2
and L3 (or the LLC). The L1 and L2 caches are usually
private to each core and the LLC is shared among all
cores of processor. The LLC is much larger (megabytes
size) than the L1 and L2 caches (kilobytes size). Cache
memories are divided into equal blocks called ways and
consisting of cache lines. Cache lines with the same
index in ways form a set. When the processor needs
either to read or write data to a specific location in
RAM, it first checks whether a copy of data is already
present in one of the cache levels. If the data is found, a
cache hit is triggered and the CPU performs operations
on the cache quickly in a few clock cycles. Otherwise a
cache miss occurred and the processor inevitably brings
data from RAM at a much slower pace. There are
two cache architectures in modern processors: inclusive
and exclusive. Exclusive caches do not store redundant
copies, hence enable higher cache capacity. For instance,
exclusiveness is widely used in AMD Athlon micro-
architectures. Otherwise, in inclusive architectures, all
cache lines in higher levels are also available in the
lower level. For instance, the architecture of LLC in
Intel’s Nehalem processors is inclusive to reduce snoop
traffic between cores and the processor sockets [8].
Inclusiveness provides less cache capacity but offers
higher performance to the processor.
B. Cache-based Side-channel Attacks
The virtualization layer enables running multiple VMs
on a physical machine. Main physical resources of the
host such as CPU and RAM are shared between VMs
through the virtualization layer, which has a strong secu-
rity impact on running VMs. Furthermore, such sharing
is strongly at odds with isolation, both at the hardware
level and at the software level. To make better use of
shared resources, some optimization techniques such as
memory page deduplication are used in the virtualization
layer. These techniques may have an impact on isolation
directly or indirectly. In such environment, processor’s
caches and especially the LLC are shared among running
VMs or virtualized instances. These caches are widely
exploited through cache-based side-channel attacks. Be-
cause the LLC is shared among all cores of processor,
it is more exploited in the case of side-channel attacks
between two VMs. The main idea of side-channel attacks
rests on the eviction of cache lines from cache and
measuring fetching time of memory lines from RAM
to know which cache lines are re-accessed by the victim
during an operation, to obtain the victim’s cache access





the victim from the cache, it takes more CPU cycles
to fetch the line from the main memory when it is re-
accessed. Otherwise, the line is already in the cache,
thus requiring fewer CPU cycles. This timing difference
is exploited to profile cache access patterns of the victim.
Generally, any cache-based side channel attack consists
of three principal steps: (1) the attacker evicts cache lines
of victim VM from processor’s cache by e.g., filling
cache sets (2) the attacker then waits for a given period
of time (several CPU cycles) while the victim is doing
some operations (3) finally, the attacker re-accesses the
same cache lines which are evicted from caches, to
know which ones are used by the victim during the
execution of the victim’s operations e.g., encryption.
There are three classes of the attacks: time-driven,
trace-driven, and access-driven. The main idea behind
time-driven attacks is to measure the execution time of
e.g., an encryption operation, and derive a secret key
from the gathered samples by finding any correlation
between measured time and the operation. In trace-
driven attacks [10], [11], the attacker inspects cache
activities (i.e., memory lines which are accessed) of the
victim during its execution in order to obtain a sequence
of cache hits and cache misses. For instance, monitoring
which memory accesses to a lookup table lead to cache
hits, allows finding indices of tables entries. In access-
driven attacks [3], [9], the attacker tries to find any
relation between e.g., an encryption process and accessed
cache lines, to exploit the pattern of cache accesses of
the victim. Technically, we may also distinguish differ-
ent techniques to perform a cache-based side-channel
attack: Prime+Probe, Flush+Reload, Flush+Flush, and
Evict+Time. Prime+Probe is the first and common tech-
nique for profiling the victim VM through a shared
cache. The attacker needs to observe which cache lines
are accessed by the victim during the execution of sen-
sitive operations using timing information (provided by
instructions such as rdtsc). The Flush+Reload tech-
nique has more resolution than other attack techniques
because of leveraging memory deduplication feature and
inclusive caches.
IV. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The main idea behind our detection approach is to
analyze periodically the behavior of running VMs, to
identify malicious activities which may be detected as a
side-channel attack. We need to have several different
fine-grained (provided by the hardware) information
gathered along the execution of VMs. To date, there
are two hardware sources providing high resolution
cache-related information on running VMs that might
be utilized for analysis purposes: Intel CMT and HPCs.
A. Threat Model
We assume a IaaS cloud and that the underlying
CPU is based on x86 architecture equipped with Intel
CMT. We also assume that victim and attacker VMs
are pinned to different cores of processor. It means
only the LLC is shared between two VMs. Thus private
resources of a core such as L1 cache and the unified L2
cache are not shared between two VMs. The detection
module aims to detect side-channel attacks conducted
between two VMs through the LLC. We further assume
that the attacker has full control on his VM and is
capable of exploiting the LLC through certain low-
level instructions such as rdtsc and clflush which
are accessible to unprivileged users in x86 architecture.
Design and implementation objectives for our detection
are as follows: (1) it should detect side-channel attacks
between two VMs through the LLC (2) it should not
impose modifications to the hypervisor to be generic
and compatible with other hypervisors (3) it should in-





B. Components of the Detection Module
In our design, we take advantage of following tech-
niques/technologies to detect the attacks:
a) Intel Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT):
Intel has introduced two features in processors to
improve cache utilization: Cache Allocation Technology
(CAT) and Cache Monitoring Technology (CMT). CAT
is basically intended to provide Quality of Service
(QoS) to running workloads (i.e., VMs, applications) in
the allocation of LLC. CMT aims for monitoring the
use of shared resources. Recent processors have several
cores allowing to run simultaneously diverse workloads
on CPU cores. This capability may potentially cause
run-time resource contention on shared processor
resources such as the LLC. Consequently, such resource
contention may result in reduced performance of the
overall system. This issue gets more importance in
real-time and virtualized systems, where performance is
critical. For instance, in a virtualized environment such
as the cloud, CMT allows monitoring LLC occupancy
of VMs running on the same physical host in a data
center, finding aggressive VMs and then reacting to such
events by applying resource usage limitation through
CAT. Regarding cache-based side-channel attacks, as
the attacker VM evicts several cache lines many times
Name Event Description
LLC-misses Last-level cache misses
LLC-references Last-level cache references
LLC-r-accesses Last-level cache read accesses
LLC-w-accesses Last-level cache write accesses
L1-dcache-misses L1-data cache misses
L1-icache-misses L1-instruction cache misses
iTLB-r-accesses Instruction TLB read accesses
iTLB-cache-misses Instruction TLB read misses
Table I: Specific hardware performance events related to
cache
from the cache, this aggressive behavior can be detected
by CMT. Hence cache occupancy is provided at the
byte-level granularity. Therefore, we can use the cache
occupancy of a VM as an effective information in the
detection of cache-based side-channel attacks through
the LLC. In our detection module, we thus leverage
CMT as a means to provide useful information to detect
these attacks targeting the LLC. To date, our detection
approach is the first to leverage Intel CMT to detect
side-channel attacks.
b) Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs):
These are special platform hardware registers used to
store statistics about various CPU events such as clock
cycles and context-switches. Those events are widely
used to profile a program’s behavior to analyze and
optimize it. Collected performance data may also be
analyzed to detect any situation of performance degra-
dation. For instance, in the Intel micro-architecture,
the events are provided by Processor Monitoring Units
(PMU) and are accessible through the perf_events
subsystem provided by the Linux kernel. For system
security, HPCS are widely used in the detection of
different attacks such as Rowhammer [12] and cache-
based side-channels [4]. Our detection module takes
advantage of HPCs to detect malicious VMs in a vir-
tualized environment. Table I gives an overview of
several hardware cache events that might be utilized
in the detection of cache-based side-channel attacks in
the system. For real-time attack detection, the detection
module should simultaneously get access to events.
Therefore, we select the most effective events among
those available for the attack detection. The detection
module aims to detect any malicious behavior induced
by a virtual machine, in the cache. We thus focus on the





works [4] [6] [13] proposed to focus on LLC-misses
and LLC-references as the important events to mon-
itor. After our observation during experimentation, in our
approach, we use LLC-misses, LLC-references,
iTLB-cache-misses, and iTLB-r-accesses as
the most effective performance counters to detect the
attack.
c) Anomaly Detection: As an application class
of Machine Learning, the Gaussian anomaly detection
approach detects data points in a data set which do not
fit well with the rest of the data set. This approach is
widely used in monitoring and diagnostic applications.
Given a data set X with m data points. Each data point
x(i) in the X is represented by n features. Among data
points in the data set, there might be some anomalous
data points to detect. The first step in the Gaussian
method is to fit a Gaussian distribution to data points
of data set. We thus calculate the mean (µj) and
the variance (σ2j) of each feature j = 1, . . . , n for
x
(1)
j , . . . , x
(m)
j , to estimate Gaussian distribution of
features.
Finally, according to a defined threshold value based
on a cross-validation, we can find anomalous data
points through calculating the probability of each data
point (p(x(i))) and finding those with lower probability
value than threshold. To find an optimal threshold, we
use a cross-validation set and calculate the F1-score [14]
for each example in the set. We calculate the F1-score
using the precision (prec) and recall (rec), where tp is
the number of true positives, fp is the number of false

















In our detection approach, each virtual machine
is represented as a data point in the data set, and
performance information such as LLC-misses and
llc-occupancy are the features of each data point.
We apply Gaussian anomaly detection on the data set to
detect any anomalous VM. As there is a limited number
of running VMs on a physical machine, the data set size
remains small and will efficiently reduce the computation
cost of the anomaly detection module.
C. Implementation
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the architecture of the de-
tection module. Our detection prototype is composed of
three threads: The main thread is the core of module and
probes periodically the system to collect statistics infor-
mation (i.e., LLC-occupancy, LLC-misses, etc.) of
all running VMs. A second thread scans the host machine
to provide a live list of running VMs. A detection thread
applies Gaussian anomaly detection on collected infor-
mation to identify any malicious behavior. The detection
module is implemented as a user space program written





in C, and operates on the KVM/QEMU hypervisor.
V. EVALUATION
To validate our detection approach, we ran 6 VMs
on the following experimental platform: Intel(R)
Xeon CPU D-1541 2.10GHz, 16GB RAM, L1
32KB, L2 256KB, LLC 12MB.
A. Evaluation Process
1) Attack Scenario: We use the code of Prime+Probe
attack provided by [13] [15]. We consider one attacker
VM and one victim VM. We assume that other VMs
perform normal operations and among them there is
a VM with a compute-intensive workload. We need
a compute-intensive workload (CIW) to determine if
the detection module is able to distinguish between
a malicious VM and a honest compute-intensive
VM (CIW-VM).
2) Experimental Scenarios: In our evaluation, we ex-
periment different scenarios for the virtualized platform.
a) No-attack, No-CIW: In this scenario, two VMs
are in idle status i.e., the attacker does not perform
any side-channel attack and there is not any compute-
intensive workload. As shown in Fig. 5.a, almost all VMs
have roughly the same values for the perf events. We
can also see that the attacker VM, victim VM, and other
VMs have normal values for llc-occupancy (com-
paring to the attack situation). All VMs have the same
LLC-misses and iTLB-cache-misses rates.
b) Attack, No-CIW: In this scenario, the attacker
performs the side-channel attack and there is not any
running compute-intensive workload. As we can see
on Fig. 5.b, the attacker has a lot of LLC-misses
and occupies more LLC space than other VMs. The
attacker also encounters fewer iTLB-cache-misses
than other VMs. Indeed, as seen before, the attacker VM
re-accesses the same memory lines several thousands
times during the attack period. Consequently, read access
to TLB cache results in cache hit.
c) No-attack, CIW: In this scenario, the attacker
VM does not perform any attack. Among other VMs, one
VM performs compute-intensive operations. As shown in
Fig. 5.c, the compute-intensive VM has very different
perf and llc-occupancy values. This VM has a
higher value for llc-occupancy than other VMs and
a large number of LLC-misses. This behavior is not
abnormal for a compute-intensive workload. However, it
has larger iTLB-cache-misses (also iTLB-cache-
misses ratio) than the attacker VM in the attack sce-
nario. In fact, the compute-intensive VM has a larger
instruction footprint that results in increasing instruction
cache misses. This difference may be considered as an
important feature to distinguish between attacker and
compute-intensive VMs.
d) Attack, CIW: In this scenario, the attacker
VM performs a side-channel attack. Another VM per-
forms compute-intensive operations as well. As we can
see on Fig. 5d, the attacker and compute-intensive
VMs have a larger number of LLC-misses and
llc-occupancy than other VMs. Although, two VMs
have a large value of LLC-misses, the attacker VM
has a higher distinct value than the compute-intensive
VM. On the other hand, the compute-intensive VM has
a larger value for llc-occupancy than the attacker
VM. We also observe that the attacker VM encoun-
ters fewer iTLB-cache-misses than the compute-
intensive VM. This significant difference may be used to
distinguish the attacker VM from the compute-intensive



















































































































LLC-misses LLC-references iTLB-cache-misses iTLB-r-accesses
Figure 2: Perf information of VMs in different scenarios
3) Origin of High Perf Values: To justify that the
high number of e.g., cache-misses measured for
attacker VM, are generated by the spy program running
in the attacker VM, we use perf-kvm. This is another
extension of perf that allows tracing/measuring a guest
OS running on top of KVM. As shown in Table. II,
clear_page_c_e is the first kernel function that
generates a lot of LLC-misses during the execution
of spy program. After verification on the guest OS, we
observe that this function is called many times during
the spy program execution. This shows that a process (in
the attacker VM) is spending its time to clear memory.
Such a situation particularly occurs during a cache-
based side-channel attack, especially in the first phase
of the attack i.e., evicting memory lines from cache. We
also verified the rate of LLC-misses when the spy
program was not executing and it was w 1.5% (see
Fig. 2). We can thus confirm that the high rate of












































Figure 3: LLC cache misses vs. sys-
tem functions for attacker VM
Additionally, as shown in Fig. 3, during a side-
channel attack, the rate of llc-occupancy increases
abnormally because of evicting cache lines from LLC
by the spy program, early in the first phase (t = 3s)
of the attack. This event is more notable in the case
of the attacks based on Prime+Probe or Evict+Reload
techniques when the attacker uses an eviction set to evict
totally a cache set.
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Figure 4: LLC occupancy of attacker
and victim VMs during the attack
Overhead shared Object Symbol
15.92% [guest.kernel] [g] clear_page_c_e
6.68% [guest.kernel] [g] page_add_new_anon_rmap
1.88% [guest.kernel] [g] __schedule
1.62% [guest.kernel] [g] __switch_to
1.44% [guest.kernel] [g] tcp_back
1.38% [virtio_ring] [g] virtqueue_get_buf
1.32% [virtio_net] [g] virtnet_poll
Table II: Output of perf-kvm for the attacker VM: top
functions generating cache misses in the attacker
VM
B. Evaluation Results
In this Section, we present detection accuracy and
performance overhead results.
1) Detection Accuracy: To evaluate the accuracy of
cache-based side-channel attack detection, we measure
the true positive rate and false positive rate generated
















Figure 5: Roc curve without & with Intel CMT
by our detection module in the different scenarios
described in Section IV. Results show that the detection
module works very well in experimental scenarios
(a) and (b), and detects malicious VM correctly.
However, our detection module may generate false
positives in scenario (c) and especially in scenario (d)
i.e., when a compute-intensive workload is present. In
Fig. 5.c and Fig. 5.d, we also notice that there is a
clear difference between the iTLB-cache-misses
rate (iTLB-cache-missesITLB-r-accesses ) of the compute-intensive VM
and the attacker VM. Therefore, this can be used as an
important feature for distinguishing between the attacker
VM and compute-intensive VM. We also observe that
a malicious VM has a lower iTLB-cache-misses
rate (e.g., 1.2%) than a benign VM (e.g., 30%).
Consequently, by using this feature, we can distinguish
compute-intensive workload and malicious VMs, that
results in a false positive reduction. We also carried out
other experimentation to assess the efficiency of Intel
CMT in detection accuracy on two different scenarios;
when Intel CMT is enabled, and when it is not. We
obtained 0.67 as F1 − score when Intel CMT was
enabled than 0.5 without Intel CMT. It means, we
effectively obtained more precision in our detection
approach through leveraging Intel CMT (Fig. 4).
2) Performance Overhead: The detection module im-
poses about 2% performance overhead to the hypervisor,
which is negligible. However, we measured this value for
6 running VMs on the platform. This value may increase
when extending the number of running VMs or during
a long period of probing to collect perf information.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new approach of cross-















































































































LLC-misses LLC-references iTLB-cache-misses iTLB-r-accesses
Figure 6: Perf information of VMs in different scenarios
Monitoring Technology (CMT), Hardware Performance
Counters (HPCs), and the Gaussian anomaly detection
method to detect malicious VMs in IaaS platforms. This
work has demonstrated the promising performance of
Intel CMT and HPCs in the detection of side-channel
attacks in a virtualized environment. As future work, we
will explore improving our approach, also comparing
it with emerging approaches for side-channel attacks
detection.
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